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Abstract: We exploit an exhaustive administrative dataset that includes the individual tax returns of 
all households in the top percentile of the income distribution in Germany to pin down the effective 
income taxation of households with very high incomes. Taking tax base erosion into account, we 
find that the top percentile of the income distribution pays an effective average tax rate of 30.5 
percent and contributes more than a quarter of total income tax revenue. Within the top percentile, 
the effective average tax rate is first increasing and then decreasing with income. Since the 1990s, 
effective average tax rates for the German super rich have fallen by about a third, with major 
reductions occurring in the wake of the personal income tax reform of 2001-2005. As a result, the 
concentration of net incomes at the very top of the distribution has strongly increased in Germany. 
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Before the recent financial crisis, income concentration was on the rise in many countries. Ordinary 
incomes stagnated, while top incomes experienced vigorous growth. Meanwhile, public deficits that 
were incurred to fight the crisis have brought about public debts of unprecedented heights. In such a 
situation, increasing tax revenues by a heavier taxation of top incomes is an often discussed policy 
option. This paper aims at informing that discussion by a thorough analysis of the effective taxation 
of top incomes in Germany.1 
To appreciate the margins for an enhanced taxation of top incomes, one has to assess the extent 
to which those incomes are actually taxed, how effective taxation has evolved before the crisis, and 
how the taxation of very-high income taxpayers compare to the taxation of the rest of the 
population. Such an analysis faces two main challenges. First, it must cope with the fact that 
legislated tax rates do not contain sufficient information to determine the effective burden of 
income taxation. One has namely to take into account the pattern and the size of tax base erosion 
triggered off by tax exemptions, deductions, and various loopholes in the tax code. Furthermore, 
one has to take into account how the liabilities of the personal income tax (PIT) interact with those 
of other taxes, notably those affecting companies. Second, a meaningful analysis of the taxation of 
households with very high incomes must contrast it with the taxation of the remaining population. 
Only by comparing effective average tax rates across income groups over time, one can assess the 
extent of true progressivity and appreciate the extent to which the distributional impact of income 
taxation has evolved. Ideally, a dataset is needed that covers the entire household population, from 
the very poor to the very rich. 
This paper addresses both challenges mentioned above. On the basis of a very rich integrated 
dataset and detailed micro-simulations we conduct an in-depth assessment of taxation of top 
incomes in Germany during the period 1992-2005. This period covers a few major reforms in 
income taxation that entailed substantial reductions of top marginal tax rates. The focus of our 
analysis is on the taxation of households in the top percentile of the income distribution. As our 
dataset includes all taxpayers in that top percentile, we can determine the effective taxation of top 
fractiles as small as the top 0.0001 percentile, i.e., the forty-six income-richest households in 
Germany.  
Our main results on the taxation of the households in the top percentile of the German income 
distribution are as follows. First, the estimated effective average tax rate for that group is equal, in 
                                                            
1   Atkinson and Piketty (2010) offer an overview about the long-run development of income concentration. The 
taxation of top incomes has been the object of studies devoted to the US; see e.g. Slemrod (1994), Feenberg and 
Poterba (2000), and Piketty and Saez (2007).   
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2005, to only about two thirds of the statutory one. This notwithstanding, the effective average tax 
rate of the top percentile is markedly higher than the ones affecting the top decile and the lower 
deciles. Second, and quite surprisingly, effective tax progressivity vanishes within the top percentile 
of the income distribution. The effective average tax rate peaks at the level of the top 0.1 % group 
and then gently declines. Third, the top percentile contributes about one quarter of the overall 
income tax revenue and that share has not changed much during the period 1992-2005. Fourth, in 
the wake of the major PIT reform of the period 2001-2005 the effective average tax rate of the top 
percentile decreased, and that decrease was especially pronounced for the richest subgroups within 
the top percentile. Taxation of top incomes became lighter precisely when pre-tax income 
concentration was on the rise.2 This policy change, together with a strong increase of gross incomes 
in the top percentile, entailed a substantial increase of the concentration of net income. Fifth, the 
inclusion of the local business tax raises the effective tax rates on top incomes by several percentage 
points, but does not qualitatively change our results regarding effective tax progressivity and 
changes of effective tax rates over time. 
Effective tax progressivity in Germany has been analyzed by Lang et al. (1997) using data 
from the income and consumption survey of 1983. They estimated the effective marginal tax rate 
for high incomes to be sixteen percentage points below the legislated one and concluded that much 
of that difference was due to tax avoidance by interest income and income from real assets. They 
also found that the effective tax rate increased with income, although the increase of the tax rate 
was shown to be negligible at high income levels. However, Lang et al. (1997) is mute about the 
taxation of top incomes, as the employed survey data do not include households within the two-
percent richest group of the population. German top incomes are instead included in the analysis of 
Bach et al. (2009). In contrast to the current paper, that article focuses on the distribution of market 
incomes at the individual level. It shows that inequality in individual gross market income increased 
in Germany in the period 1992-2003; that increase was mainly driven by growing income 
concentration at the very top of the distribution.3 
In the next section we provide some background information on the taxation of household 
income in Germany. Section 3 describes our tax return data and the method we apply to account for 
non-filers. Section 4 describes how gross income is measured from tax returns data. Section 5 is the 
core of the paper, where our main results are presented and discussed. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                            
2   That finding is in line with cross-country studies on the progressivity of the PIT. See OECD (1990), Wagstaff et al. 
(1999), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001), and Verbist (2004). For a recent comparative analysis of trends in 
national personal income tax systems across a large number of countries, see Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). 
3   Dell (2005) investigated top incomes in Germany in historical perspective.  
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2 Institutional  Background 
 
Personal Income Taxation 
In Germany, a taxpayer’s personal income tax (PIT) is computed as a function of her or his nominal 
taxable income in the corresponding year. Paid withholding taxes, such as the monthly wage tax or 
taxes on interest and dividends, are offset against the PIT liability. The tax schedule is progressive 
and includes a basic allowance. Incomes that exceed the basic allowance are subject to a marginal 
tax rate that linearly increases with income up to a threshold. For incomes larger than that threshold, 
the marginal tax rate stays constant. Thus, the statutory average tax rate converges towards the top 
marginal tax rate with increasing taxable income. Single taxpayers are taxed according to the tax 
schedule for individuals. Married couples are taxed jointly under full income splitting. In case of 
joint filing, the couple’s tax liability equals twice the tax liability of a single taxpayer whose income 
is half of the couple’s income.  
Figure 1 displays the statutory marginal and average tax rates for single persons between 1992 
and 2005.4 Top statutory marginal tax rates have been reduced from 53 percent to 42 percent.5 The 
lowest marginal tax rate was increased from 19  percent in 1992 to 25.9 percent in 1998 and 
subsequently reduced to 15 percent in 2005. This was accompanied by successive increases in the 
basic allowance, in particular a doubling of the basic allowance in 1996. In 1991-92 a ‘solidarity 
surcharge’ tax amounting to 3.75 percent of the PIT amount was introduced, briefly suspended in 
1993, subsequently re-introduced at the rate of 7.5 percent in 1995, and reduced in 1998 to the 
current level of 5.5 percent of the PIT liability.  
The evolution of the effective taxation of top personal incomes is significantly affected by 
changes in the realm of company taxation. In Germany, owners of unincorporated companies are 
subject to the PIT, in contrast to corporations, which are subject to a flat corporate income tax. 
Along with tax cuts for corporations, the German parliament also reduced the tax burden of 
unincorporated companies by means of various tax rate limitations for income from business 
enterprise (“Tarifbegrenzung für gewerbliche Einkuenfte”). The Location Preservation Act 
(“Standortsicherungsgesetz”), which became effective as of 1994, reduced the corporate tax rate for 
retained profits from 50 percent to 45 percent. By the same Act, the general top marginal PIT rate of 
                                                            
4  For an account of the evolution of the PIT in West Germany since the 1950s, see Corneo (2005).  
5   The major 2000 reform of the PIT was implemented in three steps: the first step became effective in 2001, the 
second step in 2004, and the third step in 2005. In the second (third) step, the top marginal tax rate was reduced to 
45 percent (42 percent).  
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53  percent was reduced to 47  percent for earnings from business enterprise above about Euro 
50,000.  
The Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002 (“Steuerentlastungsgesetz”) further reduced the corporate 
tax rate on retained profits to 40 percent and limited the top marginal personal income tax rate for 
incomes from business enterprise to 45 percent in 1999 and to 43 percent in 2000. The general top 
marginal tax rate for all other personal incomes was left unchanged at 53 percent in 1999. The top 
marginal income tax rate was reduced to 51 percent in 2000, to 48.5 percent in 2001, and to 42 
percent in 2005.6 The reform also replaced the limitation of the top marginal PIT rate for tradesmen 
referred to above with a partial credit against the local business tax deductible from the PIT. The 
Corporation Tax Reform Act 2000 (“Steuersenkungsgesetz”) reduced the corporate tax rate on both 
retained and distributed profits to 25 percent. By the same Act, the previous full imputation system7 
was demised in favour of a classical system with shareholder relief. Since then, distributed and 
retained profits are taxed at the same rate of 25 percent, with the former being taxed at the personal 
level at half the shareholder’s personal income tax rate. The half-income system was also applied to 
the taxation of capital gains. 
Figure 1:   Statutory marginal and average tax rates as percent of taxable income, 1992-2005 
 
                                                            
6   The Tax Relief Act introduced some complementary measures to partly compensate the reduction of tax rates. 
Those measures included restrictions for high loss offsets between incomes from different sources, more restrictive 
rules for the assessment of certain provisions, especially in the insurance and nuclear energy industries, and 
restrictions for current-value depreciations. Furthermore, the so-called co-entrepreneurship decree was temporarily 
abolished, which facilitated tax-neutral transfers of individual assets between partners and their partnerships.  
7   Under this system distributed corporate profits in the form of dividends are taxed at the same rate as retained profits 
and dividends are taxed at the shareholder’s PIT rate with an allowance for the tax paid at the corporate rate. 
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Local Business Tax 
In Germany, firms are subject to a local business tax (“Gewerbesteuer”). That tax is meant to 
compensate local jurisdictions for the infrastructure they make available to firms. The revenues 
from that tax constitute a major source of finance for local governments (for details, see e.g. Fossen 
and Bach, 2008). The local business tax was formerly levied on a broader base of the firm’s value 
added and equity, but has over the years evolved into a tax on business income. Today, the main 
item of the tax base is the operating profit attributed to the local jurisdiction. It is augmented by 
parts of the financing expenses, which represent the remainder of the former comprehensive 
business income taxation. Income from agriculture and forestry as well as from professional 
services is not part of the tax base. Unincorporated firms benefit from an allowance of Euro 24,500 
and reduced basic federal tax rates up to a taxable income of Euro 72,500. The local municipalities 
apply their own tax rate to the firms’ local tax base. In 2005, the marginal tax rates on taxable 
income ranged from nine to almost twenty percent; the nationwide average was about 16.5 percent. 
Since 2001, sole proprietors and partners of non-incorporated firms can credit parts of the local 
business tax against their PIT liability. Notice that dividend income distributed by domestic 
corporations is also burdened with local business tax at the company level. 
Tax Expenditures 
Effective taxation of top incomes is also influenced by various tax expenditures. Especially during 
the first couple of years after German re-unification, special depreciation allowances, tax reliefs and 
generous accounting rules for investments in real estate and business capital formation in East 
Germany, in combination with tax-free capital gains that could be offset against income from other 
sources, created vast tax savings opportunities. Between 1992 and 1998, most forms of capital gains 
from business income were taxed at half the rate of the then prevailing PIT rate. Other capital gains 
from capital investment were taxable only if realized within certain time periods defined by the tax 
law. Reducing those massive tax expenditures so as to broaden the tax base has been advertised as a 
prominent aim of the subsequent tax reforms introduced since the late 1990s. 




Our empirical investigation is based on official income tax returns (ITR) data for re-unified 
Germany in the years 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2005, the last year for which individual 
tax returns are presently available.8 For each of those cross sections, the ITR data include a 
representative sample of about 3 million tax returns, i.e., roughly ten percent of the entire taxpayer 
population. Samples for each of the first four of these cross-sections are drawn by the German 
Federal Statistical Office from the set of all tax files of each year so as to build a stratified random 
sample. The sampling fraction for pre-defined cells according to gross taxable income and other 
tax-relevant characteristics is determined by minimizing the standard error with respect to taxable 
income. In particular, tax return samples include all taxpayers with high incomes or high income 
losses. A crucial data issue that we deal with is the need to adjust for differences in the sampling 
scheme, especially for the substantially larger number of non-filers in the 2004 data due to a change 
in data collection. Before 2004 there was no electronic data transfer of the wage-tax returns from 
employers to the fiscal authorities, and wage-tax returns of non-filers were incompletely included in 
the German income tax statistics. Computations for 2004, the first year when the electronic data 
transfer was fully implemented, reveal the existence of about six million non-filing taxpayers that 
generated additional wage-tax revenue by about Euro 14.5 billion (including the solidarity 
surcharge tax). The 2005 data does not include those wage-tax returns of non-filers since it is 
provided by the fiscal authorities directly to the Federal Statistical Office. The data integration 
strategy that we employ to solve this issue will be described shortly. 
The original data set includes all assessed taxpayers, i.e., single persons or married couples 
who file a tax return in a given year. Slightly more than 50 percent of all tax returns are joint files of 
married couples. Assuming that one taxpayer corresponds to one household, about three households 
out of four file an income tax return in Germany. Whilst the ITR data represent the upper range of 
the income distribution very accurately, they do not portray well the lower tail of the income 
distribution and also miss a non-negligible share of taxpayers in its middle part. In particular, 
households living on social assistance or income replacement benefits usually do not file unless 
they have other taxable income. Furthermore, households receiving only wage income file a tax 
return if they want to claim itemized deductions that are not already taken into account by their 
wage tax, which is withhold at source by the employer.  
                                                            
8    This delay is due to long-lasting assessment procedures, the triennial interval between subsequent income tax 
statistics (until 2005), and the way the data are transmitted from the fiscal authorities to the Federal Statistical 
Office, and finally to the Federal Ministry of Finance.  
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A possible approach to account for those omissions in tax return data was suggested by Piketty 
and Saez (2003). Their approach is to identify the fractiles of the income distribution on the basis of 
the total number of potential tax units.9 That approach assumes that all non-filers can be placed at 
the lower tail of the gross income distribution. As mentioned above, this assumption is not palatable 
for Germany because of the relatively large number of non-filers with labor income only. 
Furthermore, the regulations concerning the provisions for filing tax returns were changed by the 
tax reform of 1996, a reform that did not only affect people at the bottom of the income distribution. 
Therefore, we follow a more systematic approach: we statistically match the ITR data with data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the same years so as to account for non-filers. 
As a consequence, a comprehensive picture of the entire income distribution is obtained, from the 
very poor to the very rich. 
The SOEP is an annual survey of households living in Germany that offers detailed 
information on incomes, both at the individual and household level.10 Information on individual and 
household gross incomes as well as income components is collected retrospectively in each wave 
for the previous year. The sample size is much smaller than that of the ITR. For example, in the 
year 2005 about 11,400 households were interviewed. Nevertheless, the SOEP represents a larger 
share of the population than the ITR since it also includes people who do not file tax returns. The 
SOEP represents the German income distribution very accurately if one disregards the 
top percentile.11 This group is instead completely represented in the ITR data. 
Our matching approach selects for each person in the SOEP a number of similar persons in the 
ITR data base, the number being determined by the relation of the respective weighting factors in 
the two data sets. The similarity is defined by a distance function using several personal 
characteristics observed in both datasets.12 Since the ITR data contain a smaller subset of the 
population than the SOEP, not all individuals contained in the SOEP can be matched to the 
appropriate number of their ‘statistical twins’ in the ITR. After all observations in the ITR data are 
exhausted by this matching algorithm, we are left with a certain number of unmatched individuals 
in the SOEP, which we add to the ITR data set and sort into the respective income percentile to get 
the integrated ITR-SOEP data set. Thereby, not only individuals who have no or little income, and 
                                                            
9   This approach was also applied by Dell (2005) using German tax return data. 
10   A description of the SOEP can be downloaded from www.diw.de/soep; see also Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005).  
11   Starting in 2002 (S-wave), the SOEP includes a disproportionately large sample of “high-income” households. This 
so-called high-income sample consists of over 1,200 households with monthly net incomes of at least 3,750 Euro. 
Although the implied level of gross income would put all members of this sample in the top 20 percent of the gross 
income distribution, only very few would make it to the top 1 percent. Thus, even taking advantage of the high-
income sample, the SOEP is not representative of the population of individuals in the top percentile of the income 
distribution. 
12   Details of the procedure are described in the Appendix 2 of Bach et al. (2009).  
 
8
therefore do not pay income tax, are added, but also those who, due to specific regulations in the 
German tax system, do not file tax returns.13 Detailed income information about these individuals is 
available in the SOEP, from which the individual PIT is calculated using a microsimulation model 
(see Schwarze, 1995). As reported in Table A1 of the Appendix, between 1992 and 2001 the 
number of assessed taxpayers remained fairly constant at about 29 millions. Then, it jumped to 35 
millions in 2004 and subsequently decreased to less than 27 millions in the year after. The matching 
approach we use adjusts for those large changes in the number of non-filers.  
The amount of local business tax assessed at the company level is not observed in the ITR data 
for the years before 2001 and we have to simulate it. Our simulation is based on the observed 
incomes from business enterprise as well as on dividend incomes. We impute interest expenses on 
long-term debt as well as other deductions and additions stipulated by the tax code using data from 
the local business tax statistics. For partnerships, we estimate the profit of the firm by imputing the 
average number of shareholders to account for the allowance and the tax progression that only 
applies to the entire firm. Starting with 2001, the local business tax base is reported in the ITR data 
because of the tax credit. A comparison of reported and simulated average values of the tax base for 
these years shows only small differences. Since there is no reliable information on the regional 
distribution of shareholders, we estimate the assessed amount of local business tax for each 
shareholder by applying the average multiplier rate. The amount of local business tax levied on 
distributed dividend income at the corporate level is estimated by applying the implied average 
local business tax rate to business income before taxes. 
4  Measuring Gross Income  
In principle, German tax law employs a comprehensive notion of income, which includes all earned 
income and capital income. However, exemptions and various types of tax relief create a substantial 
gap between taxable income and gross income. In order to obtain a measure of economic income, 
we adjust taxable income by adding all tax-exempted incomes and tax reliefs as well as by 
accounting for various tax avoidance strategies that can be identified in our data.  
In the subsequent analysis, we distinguish between the following income components: 
wage income  consists of wages and salaries, including employers’ social security 
contributions, calculated before deduction of allowable expenses; 
                                                            
13   Single or couple taxpayers who only have wage income which is taxed at the source in Germany are not obliged to 
file tax returns independently of their level of taxable income. Since the SOEP does not provide information on the 
filing status of individuals or households, we match conditionally on a number of variables, such as main income 
source, occupational status, marital status, age group, family type, and the number of children.  
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income from business activity includes taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from 
unincorporated business enterprise, and from self-employed activities, including 
professional services;  
capital income includes interest and dividends as well as incomes from renting and leasing;  
capital gains as realized from sale of an enterprise, parts of an enterprise, or shares of investors 
with substantial shareholdings, or if classified as ‘speculation gains’; 
transfer income includes unemployment compensation, social assistance, housing benefits, the 
child benefit, pensions derived from former employment, the taxable share of life annuity 
funds (pure interest portion of the annuity payment), and alimonies between separated or 
divorced spouses.  
German tax returns data record ‘adjusted gross income’ (’Summe der Einkünfte’) by adding positive 
incomes from all mentioned sources and deducting losses.14 Income from business activity and 
capital income are defined net of various related expenses. From this income measure, we derive 
(economic) gross income by adding all tax-exempted incomes as well as tax reliefs that can be 
identified in our integrated data base, as described in more detail in the Appendix. Of special 
importance is the adjustment of incomes from dividends required by the change from the full-
imputation to the classical corporation income tax with half-income taxation of dividends at the 
shareholder level in subsequent years. Until 2001, distributed gross dividends are recorded in our 
data, whereas dividends for the year 2002 are recorded net of the corporate income tax of 
25 percent. Hence, we adjust dividend income in that year by multiplying recorded net dividends by 
the factor 4/3.15 Moreover, we disregard losses from renting and leasing exceeding some thresholds 
since most of these losses are likely to arise from tax avoidance. 
As a result of our adjustments, a gross income measure obtains, which is fairly close to ‘pre 
tax, post transfer’ household income. As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, in 2005 aggregate 
gross income recorded in our integrated data base was about Euro 1.8 trillion. Excluding capital 
gains and transfer income, it totaled Euro 1.3 trillion, which represents 82 percent of total primary 
income of households as documented by the national accounts statistics. There is very little 
difference in total wage income between our integrated data base and the national accounts; the 
                                                            
14  For the years 1999-2003, the offsetting of current losses between separate income sources was restricted to Euro 
51,500 (Euro 103,000 in the case of jointly assessed married couples) plus half of the remaining total of positive 
income (see Federal Ministry of Finance, 2002). Since 2004, these current loss-offset restrictions have been 
replaced by a restriction on the use of loss carry-forwards for taxable income exceeding Euro 1 million (Euro 2 
million in the case of jointly assessed married couples), from which only a share of 60 percent allows for loss 
deduction. 
15  There is another issue concerning dividend income that relates to the corporate tax reform of 2001. Taxpayers who 
received distributed retained earnings from previous years which were taxed at the then prevailing higher corporate 
rate could claim tax returns amounting to the difference to the new 25 percent rate over a transition period of 15 
years. Although this effect may bias upward our calculation of gross income, since we only measure an increase in 
dividend income but not the corresponding decrease in shareholders’ wealth, it should not affect our calculation of 
the effective tax rate, the main focus of the present study.   
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discrepancy between gross income and income from national accounts is mainly due to incomes 
from business and capital.16 Information on the gross income levels of households in various 
quantiles of the income distribution is also relegated to the Appendix, see Table A2. The top 
percentile begins at an income level of roughly Euro 150,000. In that Table we break down the top 
percentile into smaller groups so as to show its heterogeneity. In the sequel, we refer to the top 
0.001 % group as to the German economic elite. Households in that group received a gross income 
of at least Euro 11 million in 2005. The term super-rich is reserved for the top 0.0001 % group, 
consisting of about 46 households that made at least Euro 58 million in 2005. Table A3 in the 
Appendix reports the distribution of gross income by income components. 
5  Effective Income Taxation 
5.1  Tax base erosion 
Several provisions in the tax code contribute to tax base erosion, i.e., taxable income falling short of 
gross income. Taxable income is derived by subtracting income-specific expenses, income-specific 
allowances, special personal expenses, and extraordinary financial burdens from adjusted gross 
income. Special personal expenses are those not related to a specific income source, such as the 
allowances for contributions to public or private health or pension insurance funds, educational 
expenses for own children, alimonies, the church tax and charitable contributions up to certain 
amounts. Extraordinary financial burdens include distinctive expenses for health care, disability, 
and child care.17 Furthermore, we deduct child allowances from taxable income.18 
Table 1 illustrates the evolution of the ratio of, respectively, adjusted gross income and taxable 
income to gross income. In 2005, adjusted gross income amounted to about 66 percent of gross 
income, on average. This share has declined modestly during the observation period, from a level of 
70 percent in 1992. A similar decline occurred for the ratio of taxable income, if at significantly 
lower levels. In 2005 this share was just 51 percent, i.e., 15 percentage points below the share of 
adjusted gross income.  
                                                            
16  National accounts determine business income as a residual and offer no differentiated information on business and 
capital income according to the categories used for the income tax assessment or recorded by the SOEP. 
Furthermore, non-profit organizations, which often have substantial capital income, are classified as part of 
households in national accounts. The discrepancy between our estimates and those from the national accounts may 
also be due to untaxed capital gains and undeclared capital income. 
17   See Federal Ministry of Finance (2002) for details. 
18   For taxpayers receiving the child benefit instead of the child allowance this is only an approximation. For them, the 
correct measure would require adding the difference between the child allowance and the pure transfer component 
of the child benefit. Since this difference would have to be simulated for part of the population, and we focus on top 
incomes for which this differentiation is irrelevant, we decided to simplify matters slightly here.   
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As shown by Table 1, in relative terms tax erosion is significantly less important for the top 
percentile than for the remaining taxpayers. The lowest level of the ratio of taxable to gross income 
for the top percentile was almost 71 percent and was reached in 1995. In 2005, that ratio was almost 
81 percent. The relatively high level of tax erosion for the bottom half of the distribution is mainly 
due to the relative importance of untaxed social transfers, basic allowance, and child allowances for 
that part of the population.  
Table 1:  Share of adjusted gross income and of taxable income as percentage of gross income, 1992-2005 
 
To get some insights into the determinants of tax erosion, Table 2 shows the ratio of adjusted gross 
income to gross income for each income component.19 Table 2 refers to 2005 and Table A4 in the 
Appendix displays the findings for the years before. In 2005, the share of taxed wage income 
amounted to 77.6 percent, compared to 97.8 percent for income from business activity and less than 
30 percent for transfer income. The share of taxed wage income is much smaller in the lower part of 
the gross income distribution than at the top. That is partly driven by the inclusion of employers’ 
social security contributions - which remain untaxed - into our measure of gross income. Due to the 
existence of an upper social security threshold, this has a small effect at the top of the income 
distribution, where wages tend to be high. The small share of taxed transfer income in the lower 
part of the distribution is mainly due to the fact that most of those transfers are public pensions. 
Those pensions were only taxed according to a portion of the annuity payment.  
The fraction of taxed income from interest and dividends is strongly increasing in the level of 
gross income. Whereas in the lower half of the income distribution less than 30 percent of income 
                                                            
19   Computing the ratio of taxable income to gross income by income source would require ad-hoc assumptions about 
the division of the second type of tax expenditures mentioned above between the various income components. 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
  1
st - 5
th decile   47.7    43.8    42.6    40.5    40.9    40.2    33.8    28.9    25.9    25.5    23.6    22.5 
  6
th - 9
th decile   72.2    70.6    69.5    68.8    69.4    66.4    57.2    54.5    53.1    52.1    52.4    50.2 
 10
th decile   81.0    76.8    77.0    79.2    79.6    79.6    70.4    65.3    66.0    68.4    68.3    68.3 
  Top 1%   87.7    79.5    82.8    86.6    86.4    88.0    79.9    70.5    75.4    79.9    78.6    80.9 
  Top 0.1%   90.6    82.3    87.9    90.1    88.1    89.7    84.4    74.0    81.9    85.2    82.0    84.9 
  Top 0.01%   93.7    85.6    91.4    90.7    86.1    87.9    88.3    77.7    85.9    86.4    81.2    84.3 
  Top 0.001%   93.8    84.9    92.3    87.7    79.5    82.8    89.4    77.3    85.4    84.7    75.6    80.1 
  Top 0.0001%   92.9    71.3    95.3    80.2    65.8    76.0    85.6    62.5    87.5    79.7    63.4    74.4 




Adjusted gross income                        




2)                                           
as percentage of                             
gross income
1)
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Less child allowance. 
Source: ITR-SOEP data base. 
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from interest and dividends is taxed, this share is almost 90 percent for the top percentile. This is 
mainly explained by the savers allowance for interest and dividend income that is relatively more 
important for households with low incomes.  
Table 2:  Share of adjusted gross income as percentage of gross income by income component, 2005 
 
The major source of tax erosion for the top percentile lies in the realm of incomes from renting and 
leasing. While in 2005 about 58 percent of income from renting and leasing was taxed in the lower 
part of the income distribution, only one quarter of incomes from renting and leasing received by 
the top percentile was subject to taxation. This form of tax erosion is very prominent for the 
economic elite (top 0.001 %) and even more so for the super rich (top 0.0001 %). For those groups, 
the ratio of adjusted gross income from renting and leasing to gross income from the same source 
was actually negative. Thanks to generous tax regulations concerning real estate and loopholes in 
the tax code, the economic elite could transform positive income from renting and leasing into 
income losses for tax purposes.20  
                                                            
20  As Table A4 shows, this form of tax erosion was even more prominent in the mid and late 1990s. Generous tax 
regulations introduced especially for investments in East Germany after re-unification caused substantial negative 
tax revenues from this income source, the more so for taxpayers with high tax rates. 
  1
st - 5
th decile   40.2    69.6    99.2  .    40.2    29.3    57.9    24.3 
  6
th - 9
th decile   66.4    76.5    99.5    56.9    46.4    43.9    51.1    30.8 
 10
th decile   79.6    81.5    97.1    80.9    64.1    80.0    21.6    33.6 
  Top 1%   88.0    89.1    95.8    83.0    74.1    89.5    25.0    41.7 
  Top 0.1%   89.7    93.7    93.1    82.2    85.3    93.5    36.3    52.2 
  Top 0.01%   87.9    92.9    91.2    78.3    89.1    93.6    28.3    62.5 
  Top 0.001%   82.8    95.1    87.5    72.2    89.7    93.1  -  48.1    57.2 
  Top 0.0001%   76.0    99.4    80.2    68.1    97.6    98.3  -  62.4    57.5 




























1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Including employers’ social security contributions and imputed social security 
contributions for civil servants, minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign income and income from tax-
exempted "minijobs".- 3) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities 
(professional services), plus tax reliefs, less capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) From business 
activity and from from private investments (solely speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from 
business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance, less capital gains from private investments.- 6) Taxable income from 
renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.
Source: ITR-SOEP data base. 
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5.2  Effective tax progressivity  
The effective average tax rate is calculated as the ratio of the income tax to gross income. In a first 
step, the income tax is defined as the sum of the PIT and the solidarity surcharge tax; in a second 
step, we add the burden from the local business tax. Social security contributions are not taken into 
account when calculating individual tax liabilities because the German social security system is of 
the Bismarckian variety, strongly relying on the equivalence principle. In first approximation, social 
security contributions can be viewed as outlays for insurance against individual risks that the 
individual would have incurred in the absence of mandatory social insurance, as it is the case for 
most self-employed people in Germany. As explained in Section 3, we adjust for the change in the 
taxation of dividend income for the years 2002-2005 by adding taxes paid on dividend income at 
the personal as well as the corporate level.  
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge 
Table 3 exhibits the distribution of the burden caused by the PIT and the solidarity surcharge. In 
2005, the top percentile contributed almost 27 percent of total tax revenue. In the previous years, 
the share of tax revenue contributed by the top percentile oscillated around 25 percent, with the 
important exception of 1995 when tax erosion boomed and its share of tax revenue fell to less than 
22 percent. 
As expected, the distribution of the income tax liabilities is highly unequal. In 2005, the tax 
revenue extracted from the bottom half of the distribution made less than 3 percent of the total tax 
revenue, while the top decile contributed more than 60 percent. The Gini coefficient of the 
distribution of the tax burden was almost .81 in 2005, up from .75 in 1992. The already high 
concentration of the tax burden prevailing in the early nineties has markedly increased since then. 
Table 3 also records the levels of income tax paid by the various fractiles of the distribution. 
On average, households in the top percentile paid about Euro 107,000 in income tax, measured in 
2000 prices. The average tax for the economic elite was about Euro 11 million and the average tax 
paid by the super rich was almost Euro 50 million. 
When effective average tax rates are determined, a decision has to be made about how to 
account for unclaimed losses carried forward or back by the taxpayers (see e.g. Clark, 2004). In many 
cases, those losses are deducted from the tax base and thus reduce the tax burden of the current year 
as reported in the tax statistics. Therefore, we use information on the loss claims set-off against 
taxable income that are available in the microdata of the income tax statistics in order to adjust the 
business income in the denominator when computing the effective tax rate in the respective year.  
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Table 3:  Assessed income tax liability, 1992-2005 - structure and average tax burden 
 
Average effective tax rates are presented in the left part of Table 4, in its right part we report tax 
rates measured against taxable rather than gross income. In 2005, the effective average tax rate for 
the entire taxpayer population was 11.3 percent and it was 30.5 percent for the top percentile. The 
average tax rate was less than 2 percent for the households in the bottom half of the distribution, it 
was almost 9 percent for households in the upper half of the distribution excluding the top decile, 
and it was about 20 percent for the top decile. The effective average tax rate for the top percentile is 
about two thirds of the legislated top tax rate. 
Table 4:  Average income tax rates, 1992-2005 
 
As shown by Table 4, up to the top 0.1 % group of the income distribution, the German income tax 
is effectively progressive, i.e., the effective average tax rate increases with gross income. However, 
tax progression disappears at the top of the income distribution. In 2005, the effective tax rate peaks 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
  1
st - 5
th decile   6.0    5.7    3.7    3.2    2.5    2.9    0.5    0.5    0.3    0.3    0.2    0.2 
  6
th - 9
th decile   39.8    42.5    39.1    38.1    39.7    36.9    4.3    4.4    4.3    4.1    4.1    3.7 
 10
th decile   54.2    51.9    57.2    58.7    57.8    60.3    23.1    21.3    25.3    25.5    23.7    24.0 
  Top 1%   25.4    21.6    25.7    25.4    23.4    26.8    108.5    88.8    113.6    110.1    96.1    106.8 
  Top 0.1%   11.8    9.5    12.6    11.2    9.8    12.5    502.1    390.9    558.0    486.3    400.6    497.4 
  Top 0.01%   4.8    4.1    5.9    4.7    4.2    6.0   2 062.1   1 672.2   2 622.9   2 059.0   1 731.5   2 386.0 
  Top 0.001%   1.6    1.5    2.4    1.8    1.7    2.8   6 779.0   6 075.2   10 645.3   7 690.5   7 151.7   11 124.5 
  Top 0.0001%   0.4    0.4    0.7    0.5    0.6    1.2   17 333.3   15 897.4   33 538.8   21 079.5   25 362.1   49 625.9 
 Total   100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    4.3    4.1    4.4    4.3    4.1    4.0 
 Gini coefficient   0.7461    0.7397    0.7801    0.7902    0.7881    0.8080 




Assessed income tax liability (including solidarity surcharge)
structure in percent
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Deflated by consumer price index.
Source: ITR-SOEP data base.
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
  1
st - 5
th decile   3.6    3.3    2.3    2.0    1.6    1.7    10.7    11.5    9.0    7.7    6.7    7.5 
  6
th - 9
th decile   10.0    10.2    10.1    9.6    9.6    8.8    17.4    18.8    19.0    18.3    18.2    17.4 
 10
th decile   21.2    19.8    21.6    22.1    20.8    20.4    30.0    30.1    32.5    32.0    30.2    29.7 
  Top 1%   34.8    30.8    32.1    34.1    31.1    30.5    42.8    42.7    41.7    41.8    38.8    37.1 
  Top 0.1%   42.1    37.3    36.8    39.4    34.5    33.7    48.6    48.2    43.5    44.8    40.9    38.7 
  Top 0.01%   43.4    38.5    37.7    39.8    33.4    32.9    47.9    47.1    42.4    44.6    40.1    38.3 
  Top 0.001%   42.3    37.1    43.1    38.7    30.7    31.0    46.6    45.7    48.1    44.7    39.8    38.2 
  Top 0.0001%   43.6    32.8    48.2    35.4    25.2    28.7    49.4    49.6    51.5    44.2    39.3    38.3 




Assessed income tax liability (including solidarity surcharge)
in percent of gross income
1) less deducted losses 
carried forward/back
in percent of                                 
taxable income
2)
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Less child allowance. 
Source: ITR-SOEP data base. 
 
15
for the top 0.1 % group at a level of almost 34 percent. The effective tax rate then decreases with 
income for higher income levels, reaching a level of about 29 percent for the super rich. The super 
rich thus face an effective average tax rate that is similar to the one faced by households that fail to 
belong to the top percentile. 
A key question concerning the taxation of top incomes relates to the evolution of average 
taxation over time. As shown by Table 4, effective average taxation of the top percentile has 
decreased during the period 1992-2005. Thus, while the top percentile has contributed a modestly 
increasing share of total tax revenue, its effective average tax rate has declined. This pattern is the 
more prominent, the higher the income of those in the top percentile. Thus, for the economic elite 
the effective average tax rate fell by about 27 percent between 1992 and 2005 and for the super rich 
the decrease was about 34 percent. The marked decline of effective tax rates at the top of the 
income distribution mainly occurred after 1998. This is related to the 2000 tax reform, which cut 
top marginal tax rates substantially between 2001 and 2005.21 Remarkably, average effective tax 
rates in the top decile of the gross income distribution changed little in this period. Thus, the 2000 
tax reform seems to have substantially reduced the effective tax burden at the very top, with little 
effect on other taxpayers. 
Adding the local business tax 
As mentioned in Section 2, the local business tax paid by sole proprietors and partners of non-
incorporated firms can only partially be credited against the PIT liability, and dividend income 
distributed by domestic corporations is also burdened with local business tax at the company level. 
Although formally not an income tax proper, the local business tax burden may be added to the 
nominator when calculating effective tax rates, so as to gain an insight about the robustness of the 
patterns identified above. Table 5 reports effective average tax rates that include the local business 
tax. 
For the overall taxpayer population the inclusion of the local business tax has little effect on 
effective tax rates. However, since the share of business income is strongly increasing in gross 
income, adding the local business tax burden has a considerable effect at the top of the income 
distribution. For the top percentile, the inclusion of the local business tax burden raises the effective 
tax rate from 30.5 to 34 percent in 2005. Although the inclusion of the local business tax raises the 
effective tax rates of top incomes by several percentage points, the overall picture does not change 
much. The finding that effective progressivity breaks down within the top percentile holds true also 
                                                            
21  This result is not driven by the change in the taxation of dividends brought about by the Corporation Tax Reform 
Act 2000, since we have properly adjusted dividends and taxes reported in the ITR data base, as explained above.  
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when you take the local business tax into account. The same applies to the strong reduction of 
effective tax rates at the very top of the income distribution. Including the local business tax, the 
effective tax rate of the economic elite declined by about 23 percent between 1992 and 2005, and 
the effective tax rate of the super-rich declined by 35 percent.  
Table 5:  Average income tax rates including the local business tax burden, 1992-2005 
 
5.3  The concentration of net income  
Income taxation is a key determinant of the distribution of net income.22 As shown by Table 6, the 
top percentile received in 2005 some 10 percent of total gross income, while its share of total 
income net of tax was 8 percent. Therefore, income taxation strongly reduced income concentration 
in Germany. A similar effect can be observed with respect to the higher fractiles within the top 
percentile. 
Over time, however, the concentration of net income has substantially increased. Two 
simultaneously acting forces have generated that outcome: the growth of the concentration of gross 
income and the decline of the average taxation of top incomes. This phenomenon is especially 
prominent at the very top of the distribution. The share of net income received by the economic elite 
more than doubled between 1992 and 2005, and the super-rich did even better. 
 
                                                            
22   For brevity, we neglect the local business tax in what follows.  
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
  1
st - 5
th decile   3.7    3.4    2.4    2.1    1.6    1.7    10.8    11.7    9.2    8.0    6.9    7.7 
  6
th - 9
th decile   10.1    10.3    10.2    9.7    9.7    8.9    17.7    18.9    19.2    18.5    18.4    17.7 
 10
th decile   22.8    21.1    22.8    23.4    22.1    21.9    31.9    31.8    34.0    33.7    31.8    31.6 
  Top 1%   38.2    34.3    34.8    37.3    34.3    34.0    46.4    46.6    44.6    45.2    42.3    40.9 
  Top 0.1%   46.6    42.8    40.4    44.3    39.7    38.9    53.0    53.9    47.2    49.8    46.4    44.2 
  Top 0.01%   48.4    45.0    41.4    45.8    39.9    38.9    52.9    53.7    46.1    50.7    47.1    44.7 
  Top 0.001%   47.4    43.5    47.1    45.4    37.1    36.7    51.7    52.2    52.0    51.7    47.4    44.6 
  Top 0.0001%   49.7    40.6    51.7    41.8    31.5    32.3    55.6    57.2    54.9    51.9    47.2    43.1 





liability         
fractiles
Assessed income tax liability (including solidarity surcharge) plus local business tax liability
in percent of gross income
1) plus local business tax 
liability less deducted losses carried forward/back
in percent of taxable income
2)                              
plus local business tax liability
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Less child allowance. 
Source: ITR-SOEP data base. 
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Table 6:  Distribution of gross and net income, 1992-2005 
 
6 Conclusion 
We have analyzed the taxation of households with very high incomes in Germany during the period 
1992-2005. Our analysis is based on an integrated dataset that combines data from administrative 
individual tax returns with a representative household survey, the German Socioeconomic Panel 
Study. The distinctive advantage of our dataset is that it allows us to investigate the upper tail of the 
income distribution on the basis of reliable data for the entire population. Since all taxpayers within 
the top percentile are represented in the data, we can provide a very fine breakdown of the top of the 
income distribution in Germany that does not entail any sampling error.  
We have found that the effective average tax rate of the top percentile of the German income 
distribution is 30.5 percent, i.e., about two thirds of the legislated one. This erosion 
notwithstanding, the distribution of the tax burden is highly concentrated: in 2005, the top percentile 
contributed more than a quarter of the total income tax revenue. As a result, the income tax 
significantly contributed to reduce income inequality. Effective tax progression stops however at 
the top percentile. The effective tax rate is not monotonically increasing in gross income within the 
top percentile of the income distribution; the super rich are as heavily taxed as some households that 
fail to belong to the top percentile.  
The effective average tax rate has significantly declined at the very top of the income 
distribution in the wake of the major PIT reform of the period 2001-2005. This policy change 
together with a strong increase of gross incomes in the top percentile entailed a substantial increase 
of the concentration of net income. The absolute and relative position of the German economic elite 
was much better in 2005 than at the beginning of the nineties. While this fact suggests that there 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
  1
st - 5
th decile 20.04 19.99 19.49 19.46 18.67 19.20 21.99 21.90 21.71 21.69 20.81 21.27 
  6
th - 9
th decile 48.70 48.94 47.66 48.18 48.58 47.41 49.93 49.80 48.86 49.56 49.76 48.75 
  10
th decile 31.26 31.07 32.85 32.36 32.75 33.39 28.07 28.30 29.43 28.75 29.43 29.99 
    Top  1% 9.05 8.46  10.06 9.17 8.99  10.04 6.78 6.70 7.86 6.95 7.08 7.91 
    Top  0.1% 3.49 3.14 4.36 3.54 3.41 4.27 2.34 2.29 3.21 2.49 2.57 3.23 
    Top  0.01% 1.39 1.31 2.01 1.49 1.52 2.09 0.91 0.94 1.46 1.04 1.16 1.59 
    Top  0.001% 0.46 0.49 0.72 0.56 0.68 1.02 0.31 0.36 0.49 0.40 0.53 0.80 
    Top  0.0001% 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.29 0.49 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.39 
  Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 







structure by income fractiles in percent structure by income fractiles in percent
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Gross income less assessed income tax liability, disregarding other direct taxes on 
household income or wealth, social security contributions, and other charges levied by public authorities.
Source: ITR-SOEP data base. 
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may be some room for a heavier taxation of top incomes in Germany, such a conclusion is 
premature insofar as the current paper has not attempted to incorporate incentive issues in the 
analysis. In particular, the lower level of top income taxes in Europe today as compared to the early 
1990s is likely to severely limit the domestic fiscal benefits from a national policy of heavier 
taxation of top incomes. 
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Table A1:  Structure of the ITR-SOEP data base compared to the national accounts, 1992-2005 
 
unit 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
Income taxpayers (assessment)  1 000   29 479   29 676   28 673   29 104   35 406   26 625 
  Single assessment (singles)  1 000   13 961   14 299   13 789   14 595   20 181   13 365 
  Joint assessment (married couples)
1)  1 000   15 518   15 377   14 884   14 509   15 225   13 260 
Potential tax units total
2)  1 000   42 990   43 644   44 528   45 160   46 257   46 559 
Estimated non-filers  1 000   13 511   13 968   15 856   16 055   10 851   19 935 
Private households total
3)  1 000   35 700   36 938   37 532   38 456   39 122   39 178 
Taxpayers as percentage of potential tax units %   68.6    68.0    64.4    64.4    76.5    57.2 
Taxpayers as percentage of private households %   82.6    80.3    76.4    75.7    90.5    68.0 
Gross income
4) (integrated data base) Euro mill. 1 296 985  1 430 018  1 566 397  1 655 904  1 721 288  1 786 263 
Gross income less capital gains and transfers Euro mill. 1 072 143  1 157 473  1 224 428  1 291 502  1 340 708  1 311 767 
Gross domestic product
5) Euro mill. 1 646 620  1 848 450  1 965 380  2 113 160  2 163 800  2 163 800 
Primary income of private households
5) Euro mill. 1 270 240  1 402 200  1 466 590  1 599 320  1 614 980  1 614 980 
Gross income less capital gains and transfers as 
percentage of primary income private households %   84.4    82.5    83.5    80.8    83.0    81.2 
Wage income
6) (integrated data base) Euro mill.  902 408   986 383  1 016 216  1 073 345  1 114 243  1 063 751 
Compensation of employees
6) (national accounts) Euro mill.  917 170   997 020  1 032 250  1 120 610  1 137 130  1 129 860 
Wage income from tax statistics as percentage of 
compensation of employees from national accounts %   98.4    98.9    98.4    95.8    98.0    94.1 
Income from business activities and capital income
4) 
(integrated data base, less capital gains) Euro mill.  169 928   166 927   208 953   217 521   227 257   248 142 
Entrepreneurial and property income of private 
households
 (national accounts) Euro mill.  305 720   341 280   372 010   412 420   406 140   429 980 
  Entrepreneurial income
7) Euro mill.  124 050   133 790   131 770   121 630   123 260   123 260 
  Received property income
8) Euro mill.  181 670   207 490   240 240   290 790   282 880   306 720 
Business and capital income from tax statistics as 
percentage of entrepreneurial and property income from 
national accounts %   55.6    48.9    56.2    52.7    56.0    57.7 
1) Married couples living together are assesed as one tax payer.- 2) Derived from population census statistics: Entire population of 20 years and older, married couples counted 
as one tax unit.- 3) Current population survey, may of resp. years.- 4) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 5) At current prices, national accounts.- 6) Including 
employers’ social security contributions and imputed social security contributions for civil servants, minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted 
foreign income and income from tax-exempted "minijobs".- 7) Less imputed rent of owner-occupied dwellings.- 8) Less primary income of non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISHs), less financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM), less attributed property income of insurance policy-holders.
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-2005; ITR-SOEP data base; national accounts. 
 
21
From Taxable Income to Gross Income 
We obtain (economic) gross income by adding all tax-exempted incomes as well as tax reliefs that can be 
identified in our integrated data base. Specifically, the various income categories are computed as follows: 
  Our measure of wage income includes employers’ social security contributions and is calculated before 
deduction of allowable expenses. Since civil servants are not covered by the social security system but are 
also entitled to pensions and health insurance, we have imputed social security contributions to them, 
following the approach applied in national accounts. Taxable pensions from former employment, which 
are part of the statutory income from employment, are accounted as transfer income (see below). Tax-
exempted foreign wage income is added. 
  Income from business activity includes taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from unincorporated 
business enterprise and from self-employed activities (professional services). Tax reliefs are taken into 
account as far as they are identifiable in our data, e.g., tax-exempted profits from outbound business 
investments or tax subsidies explicitly surveyed in tax assessment. Since German income tax statistics do 
not provide information from financial accounting of firms (tax balance sheet, profit and loss statement), 
we cannot account for certain tax expenditures, such as depreciations according to the declining balance 
method or provisions for impending losses or pension reserves. We also cannot quantify the extent to 
which businessmen avoid taxation by disguising private expenses as operating expenditures or 
transferring part of their profits abroad via manipulations of transfer price.  
  Capital gains from financial investments are taxable solely if they are classified as “speculation gains”, 
i.e., if sale of the asset closely follows acquisition of that asset. In 2005, for example, this meant that the 
time lapse between buying and selling had to be less than 10 years in the case of real estate and less than 
1 year in the case of other assets (e.g. securities) for the capital gain to be legally counted as taxable 
income. Thus, capital gains included here are predominantly capital gains that were realized from transfer 
of an enterprise, parts of an enterprise, or shareholdings.  
  Taxable income from interest and dividends includes all capital income from private investments, except 
income from business activities. Especially in this field we face difficult measurement issues. First, 
interest and dividend income was granted in the 1990s a rather high savers allowance of DM 6,000 / Euro 
3,070 per year (double this amount for married couples). This allowance was reduced to Euro 1,550 in 
2001, and to Euro 1,370 since 2004. We compute those allowances as part of gross income whenever tax 
units claim them. However, many taxpayers with financial income did not claim them since their financial 
income was lower. Second, bank secrecy law might have encouraged tax evasion of financial income to 
some extent. We impute income from interest and dividends using Tobit regressions estimated on 
samples of tax return data for observations that are not matched to SOEP data and use the respective 
information provided in the SOEP for matched observations in our integrated data base.  
  Taxable income from renting and leasing has been a vast loophole for tax-saving activities in Germany 
for decades, especially in the 1990s. Depreciation allowances, tax reliefs and generous accounting rules in 
combination with tax-free capital gains led to massive budgetary losses that could be set off against 
income from other sources to a large extent. Since most of these activities are likely to be motivated by 
tax avoidance, we ignore losses exceeding some thresholds. In particular, losses of more than Euro 5,000 
from direct investments in real estate and of more than Euro 2,500 from shareholdings (closed property 
funds, property developer partnerships etc.) are disregarded in calculating gross income. As a sensitivity 
check, we have alternatively included up to 50 percent of reported losses in gross income, which had very 
little effect on our calculations of tax erosion by income quantiles and effective tax rates.  
  Taxable transfer income includes taxable pensions derived from former employments, the taxable share 
of life annuity funds (pure interest portion of the annuity payment), and alimonies between separated or 
divorced spouses. We correct for the allowance for taxable pensions from former employment. 
Furthermore, we add the non-taxable share of life annuity funds, which is estimated as 70 percent of the 
whole pension up to 2004. Since 2005, the taxable share increased somewhat due to a reform of pension 
income taxation. The ITR data set also provides the non-taxable replacement amounts from insurances for 
loss of earned income (e.g., benefits from unemployment or health insurance), as they are relevant for 
taxation with progression (’Progressionsvorbehalt’). Social assistance, housing benefits, and other public 
transfers not captured by the ITR data are taken from the information contained in the SOEP.   
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Table A2:   Real gross incomes in Germany, 1992-2005 
 
Table A3:    Distribution of gross income by income component, 2005 
 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005
 Mean income   35.0    34.9    35.9    35.9    35.0    35.4    99.6    102.4    102.6    100.0    101.1 
 Median income   27.6    27.1    26.7    26.8    25.2    25.1    98.1    96.7    97.2    91.4    91.1 
 Average income
  Top 10%   109.5    108.4    117.9    116.3    114.8    118.3    99.0    107.7    106.2    104.8    108.0 
  Top 1%   317.1    295.1    361.0    329.8    315.1    355.6    93.1    113.8    104.0    99.4    112.2 
  Top 0.1%  1 223.2   1 095.0   1 566.8   1 274.3   1 195.4   1 512.5    89.5    128.1    104.2    97.7    123.7 
  Top 0.01%  4 875.6   4 569.4   7 207.2   5 346.5   5 313.2   7 398.6    93.7    147.8    109.7    109.0    151.7 
  Top 0.001%  16 280.5   17 198.3   25 936.2   20 301.4   23 741.0   36 374.5    105.6    159.3    124.7    145.8    223.4 
  Top 0.0001%  40 947.6   51 226.3   74 478.6   59 856.4   101 715.1   174 353.9    125.1    181.9    146.2    248.4    425.8 
 Lowest income
  Top 10%   66.7    68.2    69.2    70.2    70.5    69.6    102.3    103.8    105.3    105.7    104.3 
  Top 1%   143.5    142.8    151.4    153.7    151.9    154.4    99.5    105.5    107.1    105.8    107.6 
  Top 0.1%   475.8    428.0    512.1    481.9    445.5    491.9    90.0    107.6    101.3    93.6    103.4 
  Top 0.01%  2 093.4   1 772.1   2 714.5   2 096.3   1 824.8   2 248.9    84.6    129.7    100.1    87.2    107.4 
  Top 0.001%  8 627.7   8 197.8   12 068.7   9 483.0   8 633.0   10 951.9    95.0    139.9    109.9    100.1    126.9 
  Top 0.0001%  26 112.2   27 589.2   47 732.8   33 913.9   34 654.6   57 558.5    105.7    182.8    129.9    132.7    220.4 
Gross income
1)
Euro 1 000 at 2000 prices
2) 1992 = 100
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Deflated by consumer price index.







th decile   19.2    9.6    5.1    5.6    4.3  -  2.8    15.8    14.2    19.4    47.7 
  6
th - 9
th decile   47.4    54.9    26.1    30.2    19.0    3.4    30.0    28.5    33.3    42.3 
 10
th decile   33.4    35.5    68.8    64.2    76.7    99.4    54.2    57.3    47.3    10.0 
  Top 1%   10.0    5.9    44.0    43.6    44.8    93.5    30.6    33.8    23.5    1.2 
  Top 0.1%   4.3    1.2    22.5    29.7    10.2    80.3    17.7    21.9    8.2    0.2 
  Top 0.01%   2.1    0.3    11.6    17.6    1.1    63.3    8.0    10.8    1.8    0.0 
  Top 0.001%   1.0    0.0    5.4    8.4    0.2    45.6    3.1    4.4    0.2    0.0 
  Top 0.0001%   0.5    0.0    2.2    3.4    0.0    31.0    0.8    1.2    0.0    0.0 
 Total   100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
  1
st - 5
th decile   100.0    29.8    2.5    1.8    0.8  -  0.1    3.6    2.3    1.4    64.1 
  6
th - 9
th decile   100.0    68.9    5.2    3.8    1.4    0.1    2.8    1.8    1.0    23.0 
 10
th decile   100.0    63.3    19.5    11.5    8.0    2.3    7.2    5.2    1.9    7.7 
  Top 1%   100.0    34.9    41.5    26.1    15.4    7.1    13.5    10.2    3.2    3.1 
  Top 0.1%   100.0    16.4    50.0    41.7    8.3    14.3    18.3    15.6    2.6    1.1 
  Top 0.01%   100.0    7.2    52.5    50.7    1.8    23.1    16.9    15.7    1.2    0.3 
  Top 0.001%   100.0    2.8    49.8    49.3    0.5    33.9    13.4    13.1    0.3    0.1 
  Top 0.0001%   100.0    2.1    42.1    42.1    0.0    48.4    7.3    7.3    0.0    0.0 











Capital income less capital gains
by income fractiles, in percent













Income from business activity
3) 
Thereof: income from
1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2)  Including employers’ social security contributions and imputed social security contributions for civil 
servants, minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign income and income from tax-exempted "minijobs".- 3) Taxable income from 
agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services), plus tax reliefs, less capital gains from business activity, 
plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) From business activity and from from private investments (solely speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from investments 
(exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance, less capital gains from private investments.- 6) Taxable income from 
renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.
Source: ITR-SOEP data base. 
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th decile   40.5    69.3    94.3    106.7    28.9    26.7    32.9    24.8 
  6
th - 9
th decile   68.8    76.2    98.1    28.5    31.4    37.0    17.3    31.7 
 10
th decile   79.2    81.5    95.7    87.4    50.9    77.9  -  48.5    33.0 
  Top 1%   86.6    89.6    95.1    91.9    65.2    88.7  -  32.1    42.0 
  Top 0.1%   90.1    93.3    93.6    94.3    80.7    93.6  -  9.9    53.2 
  Top 0.01%   90.7    94.2    91.5    92.3    87.4    94.7  -  17.0    60.9 
  Top 0.001%   87.7    91.8    86.7    83.7    91.8    96.7  -  56.7    49.9 
  Top 0.0001%   80.2    94.0    78.0    58.8    95.6    98.2  -  88.4    73.5 
 Total   66.7    77.3    96.4    82.7    42.1    60.0  -  10.6    27.9 
  1
st - 5
th decile   42.6    70.1    98.2    83.4    12.0    11.5    12.8    25.2 
  6
th - 9
th decile   69.5    76.2    98.6    61.1  -  1.8    14.4  -  30.2    32.9 
 10
th decile   77.0    81.0    96.4    96.0    5.2    64.9  -  186.5    39.3 
  Top 1%   82.8    89.5    96.0    98.4    20.5    82.6  -  207.8    39.9 
  Top 0.1%   87.9    94.2    95.1    99.8    44.7    90.4  -  230.8    44.3 
  Top 0.01%   91.4    95.7    93.0    100.0    58.7    91.6  -  327.7    38.6 
  Top 0.001%   92.3    96.9    92.8    100.0    68.8    92.7  -  270.4    35.6 
  Top 0.0001%   95.3    97.0    95.5    100.0    73.5    83.5  -  129.4    40.9 
 Total   66.8    77.1    97.2    95.0    4.4    45.0  -  95.4    29.1 
  1
st - 5
th decile   43.8    71.4    92.5    65.1    11.8    7.1    19.1    23.8 
  6
th - 9
th decile   70.6    77.0    98.6    32.9    4.8    15.8  -  17.4    32.8 
 10
th decile   76.8    81.2    97.1    87.9  -  9.4    67.0  -  227.1    43.0 
  Top 1%   79.5    88.6    96.7    95.0    1.1    87.4  -  254.9    43.6 
  Top 0.1%   82.3    93.3    96.0    99.6    24.8    96.8  -  293.4    52.2 
  Top 0.01%   85.6    94.5    93.9    99.8    41.5    99.3  -  394.3    58.7 
  Top 0.001%   84.9    96.1    88.9    99.7    43.9    99.8  -  589.0    50.4 
  Top 0.0001%   71.3    92.5    75.2    100.0    14.9    99.9  - 2 247.1    73.7 
 Total   67.1    77.6    97.5    84.4  -  1.3    42.6  -  101.5    28.2 
  1
st - 5
th decile   47.7    72.5    99.6    79.2    13.9    11.9    17.9    25.4 
  6
th - 9
th decile   72.2    78.0    99.7    65.4  -  4.8    11.3  -  41.0    33.2 
 10
th decile   81.0    82.2    99.0    94.4    33.4    81.8  -  129.8    39.4 
  Top 1%   87.7    89.7    98.7    97.3    49.1    99.8  -  146.9    44.1 
  Top 0.1%   90.6    94.0    98.3    99.7    63.2    100.0  -  166.3    51.2 
  Top 0.01%   93.7    93.8    97.8    100.0    75.8    100.0  -  193.6    59.3 
  Top 0.001%   93.8    95.0    96.8    100.0    73.1    100.0  -  496.9    60.3 
  Top 0.0001%   92.9    92.4    96.7    100.0    75.5    100.0  -  439.6    76.3 

































1) For the definition of gross income, see Section 4.- 2) Including employers’ social security contributions and imputed social security 
contributions for civil servants, minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign income and income from tax-
exempted "minijobs".- 3) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities 
(professional services), plus tax reliefs, less capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) From business 
activity and from from private investments (solely speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from 
business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance, less capital gains from private investments.- 6) Taxable income from 
renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.
Source: ITR-SOEP data base.Diskussionsbeiträge  
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